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A REVIEIJ{ OF ECONOI:IC AND TRADE R-LATIONS  BETU'IEEN THE
UNITED STATES AI{D TIIE COiIi',UNITY
Economic er-nd conrnercial relati-ons between the United. Stafes
and the Coianunity are causino concern on both sj-des of  the Atlantic.
It  has sornetimes  seemed in  Europe that  fairly  profound misconccjltioits
ryerc current in  certain American circles  which have been tryin;;  to
assess the results  so far  achieved by the United States i:olic;'  of
sui)'.)orting; lluropean inte6rafion  and to  estimate its  impact on econoiilic
rcla'bions between Europe and the United States. Consequently it
is  uscful- to recall  certain  facts  which may help to  correct these
rnj-sconce;tions, This iia?er does not cover certain  questions whi-ch
havc recently arisen j-n relation  ej-ther to  Corrununi-ty agreeiaents
r.'rith iiediterranean countries or to the international  consequences  of
the Coinmunityts  enlar;ement. Such questions, whose irnportance  cannot
be minj-mized, will  be examined in  the appropriate' frameworkr in
pa::ticular that  of  Gr.TT.-)-
Favglab1e .degqloqnent  . o {  Uj,:EE9_tqe.de
1,  Farti,grl"r  erttention should be given to the vray econornic
rt:latlons  between the United. States and the Cornrnunity are develoitipg.
0n an overall  basis, this  developnent compares very favqSa!]y  not
only vrith the trend of relations  between the United States and other
;rari;s of  the worId1 but also with developments in  the period before
the Connunity was establishedl nothing suggesfs tho.t the trc.nd that
has been characteristic  of  the last  ten years and nore vrill  not be
ma-intained in  the fu'bure.  .
At present the total  trade between the United States and tire
Comillunity amounts to  some 1) billion  d.ollars, r,vhich is  three tiincs as
high as in  1!JB. This grovuth of  trade, both i-n agricultural  and" lndus-
trial  :.,roducfs, has been uninterrupted, and has always been faster
than tne average for  world trade. Every year from 1960 to  196? the
United States had a 1a.r5e surplus -  averaging 1.2 billion  dollars  per
annun -  on its  trade accounf with the Cornnunity.
From 1958 to  1969, exports f:.om the United States to  the EEC
grerrv by lBZiJi during the same perioo Aneri-can exporfs to  the EF'IA
cor'.ntries, for  exanple i-ncreased, by 14iil,  and to  the rest  of the vrrorld
by 1 1B;- .
Arnerlcan exports to the Comrnunity have continued to-growr and
it  was only the abnormalty rapid expansion of  doniestic dernand in  thc
unitcd statL:s in  195B whj-ch led to an exceptional growth of  impor-ts
and sharply reduced. a long-standing trade surplus. But in  1cr5) the
Coriirlu.nityrs trade deficit  lvith the United States was.once again in
excess of  one billion  dollars,  exports from the USA totalling  /  billion
dollars  and those from the EEC 5,8 billion  dollars.
In  1969, American exports to the EEC were lJ.fuhLgher than in
1968, while us exports to  EFTA increased. only 4'i  and. to  the rest
of  fhe world 9.51'!. Conversely,  Arirerican imports fronr the Cornnrunity
decreased by 1.4/o, whereas those fx'om the'rest  of  the world went u:r
by 10,61'!r.  :  ri-2^
ggd.erate lgriff  1evels rJr tie  Co::rmunib-
2.  Aniong the factors that  contributed considerably to the groi;th
of US exports to the EEC, a major eLement undoubtedly Nas the ra1:i-d
rise  in  tlie stand"ard of living  which went hand in  hand vuith the
creation of a very large irarket in  the Cor:rniunit.y"
But j-t must not be forgotten how much the establishment of  the
Coiitnunityrs  common customs tariff  and the red.r.ictions rnade on this
tariff  in  tire major trade negotiations irave given an irnpetus towa,rcl a
liberal  trade policy  in  the wor1d. The Corlntunit)'hasr as a resu.lt of
a series of tariff  rcductionsr ended up *ith  the louest tariff  a.non6
the leading i-ndustr:ializecl nalions, Once the last  tvro reductions
resulting  frorn the Kennedy round are implemented  betvreen now and- the
end of  1971 r the average Comiluni-ty tariff  for  industrial  products
wil]  be sbstantially  lov'rcr than the United. States, Uni'bed Kingdor,r
or Japanese average. In addition,  tb.e Comruunityf .s tariff  structure,
which resulted initiall.y  from the avera.ging of  member states fo::ne::
tai:iffs,  does not have any of  those very high ratesl  in  sone cases
above 1OQ?'lt whj-ch are still  characieristic  of  the Ame:'ican tariff  for
certa,in industrial  products which are thus assurei a very substantj-er1
andr, in  some ca6es, even prohibitive  level  of ;rrotectiorl.  C,n v,aluation
for  customs pu rnoses ,  the Ccmrnunit;', but not the Unitcd Statcs,  f ollows
thc rules of  the Brussels Convention and cannot, therefore,  reso::t to
practices which artifi,cially  increase the incidence of  customs dr-rties
by an  arbiba;'y assessment of  the value of a ;rrod"uct.
The effort  that has been nade by the connunity in  its  ta:iff
policy  should be recognized when its  nole in  the field  of  inte:rn:.ticna1
econornic relations  i-s appnaised.
NoJr-tariff balrj-erF boi;h_in thg_U.S apd j,he E"E"C,
3,  It  has sometimes  been suggested that  the community has
systernatical-Iy rc'placed its  tariff  barriers  by non-tariff  barr:Lers.
This impressj-on in  no way corresponds  to the facts,  ,-4;
Tht added value tax (fVn) is  sometj-rnes referred to as a non-
ta::iff  barrler.  A better  understanding of  hovu this  tax r,vorks has
helped to  dispel the misconceptions which have arisen on this  a.ccount
and vuhich have wrongly 1ed to  the terinrrborder taxfr, vrith the inpli-
cation that  the add.ed-val-ue tax has the same effect  as a custcms
Cuty. IL  should be stressed that  the TVA applies to  domesti-c  prcd.r.rcts
in  e,'ractly the s{rme way as to  irnported. lrooucts,  just  like  the sales
ta:res of ind,ividual states in  the US or other taxes of  the same'cypc
at  federal leve1.  .
On the sub ject  of  rea-1 non.-tariff  barri.ers, t:re i.initcd Sta.tcs
ancl the Conrnunity ha'rre co-operated activeJ-y in  the GJrTT i-n the lrcpara-
tion  of a comprehensive  survey which shows that  these non-tariff
barri.;rs  inciude a vast range of  different  measures, sonie intend.cd to
plovide hiddcn protection,  but nany siinply resulting  fror,r thc proli-
fcr;rtion  of  the technical,  safety and health rules  and regula-tions
r,vhich are a feature of  the rnodern vrorld. In  the synoptic tabl:  irrc,:ared
by the GATTT the list  of American measures to which other countries
Itqrrn  nri  aaA  nhi.:n*inna  -i d  -irra*  ^a  1^-^  ^o  +1^ --Jections is  just  a.s long as the list  covering the
Conirnuni-ty and j-ts member states.  This was to be expecteCu ancl ti;e
recluction of  ihese barriers  on a reciprocal basis will  require a
ccnsid,erablc ef fort  fron a}l  countries. !'/hatever the progress iradc
j-n thj-s direction,  the partners o,f the Conmunity v,riJ-l in  any case
benefit  from what is  being done to irarnonize technical,  safefy anCL
ltealth rules ano regulations in  the Comnon l"iayket, and v'rill  in  tl:c
fnturc  bc face'f with a si-n51 c se-t of rules or regulations whorcas
until  nov; there have been as rnany as six.  In  related fields,  such as
tnat  of monopolies, the work now being d.one in  the Comnunity wi-ll
undoubtedly  have beneficial  ef ects for  non-rnember countries.
In  this  context political-  and economic circles  in  Eurolcu continue
'l-n  nvnracc  .|l.rai-  ua---].ainlnzrw  .F  +L^  n."^ 
*
-..-*r  disappointment at  the existence' of  the Anerica:r ,Sel-ling
Fricer  which thc United States should have abolished two years a3o in
accordance vlith the rrChomieals  Agreementtt concluded j-n the Kennedy
Round". This delay is  all'the  more regrettable  beiause of  thc s;nlbollc
va.lu-e of this  agrecment, the first  on a major non-tariff  barrie-r, and
also becausc j-t prevcnts the tarlff  and non-tariff  concessions made by
thc Comrnunity in  the agreement from being carrled out.*5"
rnercasing acti'ri.ty  of f-mcrican firnLs in  the corri,:runit-r
Ll-  An analysis of  the economic relations  between the un.i-ted
Statcs and the Comrr:unity  cannot overlook the extent to xhich a. large  '.
nurilber of American firms have cleveloped their  activities  vrithin
flrn  T"^z".trrhi+"  *1^^*..  +]^.,--  1^-*-^  f^----^r  -J^1i!i^-^^1  --  ----!-----:!i-  ^  J r/lru uul.inlunr-r,y wJrere they have found additlonal  opportunities for
cxpansion.
Fron 1953 to  1!6E airect  lnvestment by American firms in  the
con:;tr:nrty ir,cr'eased nearly five-fold,  their  total  asscts reaching
a bock value  of  9 bilLior-  doll-ars in  1!68 compared with  1.9 billion
doll-ars in  1958. In no other regi-on of thc rvorlcl has investiacnt by
Anerican firms ex-oanded at  such a specta.cular pace; in  fact,  tl:.eir
investmen'bs elscwhere have only doubl_ed in  the same period,
.i:'t pri:sent, rt'merican firlrts establj-sired in  t1:.e Comrnunity accou-nt for
abcut one-seventh of all  new industrial  investmenr. llhi-lc at  thc
beglnning this  developrnent was sustalned by le-rge exports of  "l"inc::.j-can
ca-lita.l ,  -prcsently th+ capital  for  thrlse investnents vo-r;r oftcn  ccrles
frolir issues floa.ted in  !.Jurope. The Unitecl States econony, t.here.fore,
bcnefits dc;ubly from European integration;  fron a considerable
inc::ease in  trEde between tlie United S'bates and the Comi:,iu-nity and
frcn a substantial rise  in  inconc froni invest;;ient in  Europe r,vltich
is  rnaking a major contributicn  to  improvement of  the u.s.  b,al.ar:ce
of  nrrrmon*e
irn_.grtwe{g-l-9  o k :!.ng_4,,.4:-9,:.
5.  This overall  picir:re  of  EEC-US relations  clcarl-y shows that
+i'^  n^-"'n'r-'i'l-"  's  not  foll  o'rin.r  nc,sf.ninf  irrn  nr  nr^of.r:cl-.icnisb  '-.o1i-cies. v,.rv  vvrirruurlruJ  Ju  rfvv  rv!!vwfltj  IgDUaJ-uLJ-vu  uI  uI  vu9vuJvII_,-D
Th.:  fnrnrrrr:r-l*tr  ; !''v  vv''uu*ruJ -s the worldrs largest  importe:' frorn both industriaiized
and under-developed count::ies, and the growth rate of  its  foreign
trade is  higher than that cf  the otirer western nations. As a.
nattcr  of  fact,  it  is  in  the comn:unityts interest  to br' outrvard-
Iooking, because of  its  dependence on world trade in  the for:,':i'"tj-on
and grow'bh of its  national- prod.uct. The EECts J-niports ancl ,e:ci:orts*6-
.,  of
account for  nearly zo%/:-ts gross national product, i'ihile in  the
United Stat,-rs thc corresponding figure  Ls onLy lc,*.
Tariff  preferences for  the develo:ring countries
---
6.  In  viev'r of its  responsibility  as the leading i-mporter in  the
uiorld the Corumunity has, starting  with the first  Unitcd l$a.tions
Conf'erence on Tracle ancl Development in  1954, supported. the cstLblrshnient
of a system of  t.ariff  prefe;.ence for  manufactures  and. scmi-
inanufactures  exported by the developing countries, in  order to
help therc. ovcrcon:e thcir  com;tetitlve  handicerps in  thcse Froducts.
Rinna  .{.lrnn  'iAe^a  ^-  *i-'a  o,,1.'-i, v::vr^! *udo.6 on the subject have taken nore dcf:-nite sha.pc
and all  the industrialized  countries have decle-red. thc,aseL.ves
rcad"y in  principle  to  introduce tariff  preferences for  the develol;ing
corinbrj-cs. The system prol:osed by the Comirrunity would ,orovide ciuty-
fr.cn  ,"r:*rrr  fnr rr ev utrer J rvr  all  these irroductg withou'u exception up f o a coi lr"ng
lvhich.r once the system corrres into  force,  uould irnn:ed.i-ately  be
ecll:el to twice the prcsent tota.l volurne of  exports cf  thosc
p:'oclu-cts frcrn devcloning countrics to  the EEC. There is  r:,:
safeguard cl.ause, no reciprocity  or any other cond.ition for  the
participation  of  any developing country. Th'ese trade.advantergcs
ttould benefit  xin:arily  the developing countries in Latin Anier.ica
and Asia urhich are alrcady relatively  advanceC on the :.oad to
industrialj-zation.  They would compl'ement the' considerabl.e ef:forts,
already riiade by the Communrty and its. rnenber, states th:'ough irublic
and private  dcvelopment aj-C, which in, relation  to.GNP is  substantial-
ly  greater than that  made by the United States (in  f968, EECI
4.2 litl-ion  dollars  or  1.12iz( of  GNP; United. Startes i  5.T bil]ion
dollars  or O.55ii ot  Gl.tP).-7*
3h9__q.S!I4!t s aq-ri-gu_l tur il--p.*iS:SE
7,  Of ccursee e sati-sfactory cverall  situation may eonce;?.f d-iffi-
culties  ln  specific matters r:r certain sectcrs.  fn the Com::nunity
there is  an arrareness that the c:Jmmen agri-cu-ltural policy,  for  exa.rnplet
is  scmeti-nes *rcngly crlticized. by the United- S-bates and ot.her
ccuntries"  Here again, a.ny serlous analysis should- includ-e bcth
:r nrrdr:ci-brr--:r.roduCt eXaminaticn  a,,ncl a loe'k et Overall trenrlS. v  v.;  .!.r  \
Within the Communi-by, eff.-rrts ar3 being mede to bring und-er c;nt:cl  the
surpluses r,,rhicn have occused in  scme sectcrs, especi"ally in milk ani
nJ-lk prod-ucts, and- tc  start  structural  reforms that  a,re ind-:ispensable.
Hoffevere the Comnunity is  still-  the mpsi import;."nt m-r.rket
1'rr f-r  f rn  TT( -+r"i ^rr.l*rrr-'r  :vnqiNg.  In  1968 the  Ccmri.u:rity  imported. eJ  Lat  LJL  vu  GSrtruuruur@*  r4!vrvD.  1tt  !/v 
fgfi
American agricultulal  prod-ucts wcrth 1.4 billion  d-cl-lard ccmpared
tc,' 1.1 billion  rLc.ll-a::s in  1960. True, between 1955 and. .l-958 there was
a d-rop i-n Arnerican agricultural  cri-1or-bs, Crich in  L966 h:,d risen
to 1.6 lillion  d.ollars but the d.eclj-ns was not confj.ned. to exports to
the Community. fn the years f967-69 American exports of agri-cultural-
lricd-ucts tc  all- par-ls ,.,f the worlcl r,rere lower than tn 1956, vhich was
a rccord_ ycau.  li,;316 tracle in  these prcd-ucts is  slcwcd- mainly by the
^*nonr*ir,r  a'P fn.r,l  ^nr^rrrnn*irn  {n  the  highlV  d.evel:ped  Countries  and" by DV66rlf  UIJIM  MU  UUIiDWIII'l4  JLt  LLt  uarv  $+tf,*-.,r  v
the rapiC grrr,rth cf agricuftural  prcd-uctivity and- producticn.  It  wculd-
therefore be unreasc,nable  to attribute  the recen'f d-rcp in  US agricultural
exports tc the Commrrnity so1e1y tc  the effects of Community protection'
Incleede tire sherre cf the Conmunity in  LE agricultural  expcrts hard-ly
changed- during recent ye-a.r's (tg|+  z 22 /,,  1955 z 23 f", 1968 z 2l  ii") '
In this  ccntext it  rnust 3lslr Le pointec. out that  apprcrinately {A /" $
*la^  Cnrr:.Fi+r,  l a  imnnr*^  ,-.1' ---''l  a,,'l*rrra'l  nr^,1.;:CtS  ff  Cm the  Uhited-  StatgS uJ-!e  vulllultliiruJ'Fj  IuI.j-J'Ja  u5  '-1  .:6f  4eqruuro-L  yrvs4r
come in  d-uty free and- without airy restricticn.
'a''  The growth of government expend-5-tr:re  on agriculture j-s oommon
r.  to all  eountri-es, even where the productlvlty per farm worker is
higher and. tbe farmi-ng p,:pulation smaller than in  the Commu.nity
(in  tl.e United. States 4.6 /, of the working population was employed.
in  agriculture tn 1968; ln the Conrnunity the flgure  lras 20 /o tn
7.960 and. today it  is  sti1I  14 %).  If  a comparistrrr is  nade between
agricultureLl suppqrt per person employed. (bud"getary ertrren&iture plus
cost bcrne by the consumer through higher prices) in  the United.
States ancl the EEC, the figu::es are of the seme magnitud-er  d.espi-te
the fact  th.at the competitivlty of agricuiture in America is  on
the r.itrole higher than ln  the Cornmunity.
lj"kewise, the d:ifficulties  encountered- in  reconciling  d.omestic
agricultural  policy  and- lts  human a4d, social problems wLth import
pclicy  are comrnon to all  d-eveloped- countries, but they have d.ecld-ed-
to solve them in  d-ifferent:?r&Jrs.  The-Ur:ited.  States..was granted a
1 waiver of, tbe normaf GATT rrrles wLlch alIows it  to apply the Agricultural
Ad.justment Act of  19332,and. it  pursues restrictive  import polici-es  on
items suoh as miik prod-uctse, sug&Te and rneatl drl1e it  subsld.izes
certaLn exports.  Fhe Cr:mmunity has, for'some major products, set up
a levy system (r,*iictr replaces. the quantitatlve restrlotlons,  oustoms
d.uties and other charges applled" earlier  by the Member States) and
export refund.s. Other countrles have other methoo-s'
Greater disclpline  on wor1d. agricultural  markets desira',:le
8.  At prescnt the international market for  agricultural  products
is  morc cften the scene of rivaLry between public treasuries than of
comr:etition betreen producers.-q-
0n several occasions the press has spoken of 'rprice fiar.5tt
between the Comnunity and other exporters on wcrld- mar'kets fc,r certain
^ --i  ^-.'l  +".r",'l  nrn,l*a*a  i n  nor*i  nrrl  nr  .cr:ri  ilq  ln  I  *^"1+''-'
a.dl'IUull-.rLt-L'ar-i- !rO(}t.lc  USt  LI!  PAL' U.Lvsrdr  6rr-!rrro  arr*  j'vqrur?/  o
,lr'n  ir  cnmn ^-dad  flnmm,rni+rr graih  cxporters  diC  nct  re{)ect  the f,l-  L,{.U t  III  iiLlllv  vclr'>sD,  vvuuuqrrr  uJ
minimum prices set by the Intern:,tional Gralns Agrcement. But the same
has been true al-so for  erporters of other countries, including the
Unlted Stateg Ind.eed, all  had- tc  cope with an excessive supply on the
wcrld. market.  l[ith  regards to pou]try,  Arneri-can, Da^nish and- Community
nvra-*..r..  armn^*a  hw means of  substantial  subsid-ies  in  Sone European s4!vJ  usf  D  vr  r!j1e  trU
markets nhere the pri-ce l-evel has also been affecteC by ccmpetiti-on
from East Eurcpean countries.
It  is  urgently necessary, if  not tu remcd.y tbis  situation,  at
least to 1lmit its  consequoncesr  and this  requlres an effoi't  by all
the lead-ing exlrcrting  anC- J-rnpcrting cruntries.  It  lra.s in  this  spirit
that the Commpnity proposed, r.s part of the Kcnnedy Rcund., that  suppo:'t
in agriculturee whe,tever its  form, should- be froaen on th.e basis of
rnn-!nrnnirrr  Rfforts must ccntinue tc  find  some form of internationaf rvw!_LrIvwruJ.  !.
.rionirlina  r^,hinl Will  obviate  the  damage produqed- by the  cl.ash cf q4DUryrrrrg  wuJvr
national poli-cies on the l,y\rrld- market.
Llost cases which hs.ve of late  created. irritation  on troth sid-es
of the Atlantic  ciul] I€&sonably be solved- through a reciprocal
gI  I  VI  V .
.,it'
-10-
Anerican  me asure s jlffect j,gg_the Community
9,  In the United" States one sometimes seems to have the id-ea that
complaints about the Community by far  exceed in  number :nd. lmportance
any critieisms that the Cc'mmunlty could- make about the llnited" States,
It  must be pointed- out, however, that vatlous events e,nd tend-encies
i-n the United- States have caused. d.isappointment  and concern in  the
f'ln-m:'ri  *.'
Fcr examplee the GATT waiver obtained- by the Unlted States ln  crd.er
to protect its  agriculture is  consld-ered an anomaly because of its
ccmprehenslve character and the fact  that it  has been malntained since 1955,
Likew{ss, the fact  that,  because of earller  legislation,  the United-
States is  not sub;ect to the common rr.lles observed- by other Contracting
Partles ccncerning cou::tervailing d-uties is  meeting wtth fess and less
und-erstanding, and- thls  situation  affects,  for. cxample, Community
prod-ucers of canned. tomatoes.
The American restrictions  in  the ml1k prod-ucts sectorr thich  were
tightened" up in  L968, seem excesslve, and. it  is  regrettable that tbe
Cornmunityr  s eff crts to  sol-ve by adrninistratlve cooperaticn the problems
in  this  sector have met with no Testorlse,
fn 1968, the Unlted. States unilaterally  i-ncreased customs d.uties
on cer-bain woolen products which were consolidated. in  the Kenned.y Round..
This action, wkich was taken witlrcut fcllcning  normal GATT procedures
l.nd. without any offer  of compensatLon, has caused understandable conceln
in the Community, parttcularly  because of the precedent thus created.
l,lkewise the introd.uction ln  1968 of import restrictions  on
certain products of the mechanicaf indrrs-bries has d-one consid-erabl-e
harm to flrrns in the Communlty,
a-11 -
3utthereisa1soconcernaboutthegenera1d-irectionofAmerican
trad-e poiicy,  r:specj-ai-ly since seetor*by-sector restrlctionr:e either  t
rhrr,rrch nr.i rrnto agreements or self-limitatlon  imposed by the  goverdnent r oil
vlrav4tu  yf4vsv.J
^-ron *hnnrron nrrgf,sg for  whole sectcfs  have been ad"vocated i:r  the  US. vvErt  uurvq6u  YV-\
Aband.onment cf the brca,lly liberal  pollcy pursued. by the un:Lted- states
since the Seccnd. }Iorld. 'dar and a return to such restrictive  practices
wou-fd be inevltably start  a chain reaction d"etrlmental to the expansion
of world- trade,  Such a development would- not be in  the common interest
of the Wester:n coirntries.
IrT-^,:^-i *rr  f rr  .-nnncr"qii on hetr^'een EEC and US r!c'vvDDr  u-y  rvr  vvvPUr
10.  To the contrary, it  would seem moro necessar.y than ever for  the
two le;rdin.q rra.rtners in  worl-d" trade, the United- States and- the Community
*.r  -mras  -|ln^*  +ho  rrr,,rh'lemq  affe-+inc  ind  irri,lrral  SeCtOfS  Of  CaUSing UU afl;l'g9  bIIe'V U",-  a.  "-** Jw vrtr6  rrru:  v +suc
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